Modeling Foreign direct investment by a Prisoner’s dilemma: Greenfield investment (cooperation) or Mergers and Acquisitions (defection)

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Modeling Foreign direct investment by a Prisoner’s dilemma: Greenfield investment (cooperation) or Mergers and Acquisitions (defection)

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Title: Modeling Foreign direct investment by a Prisoner’s dilemma: Greenfield investment (cooperation) or Mergers and Acquisitions (defection)
Author: Nguyen, Duc Thien; Ha, Thi Thu Trang
Abstract: Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a heterogeneous flow of funds, composed of both acquisition (cross-border mergers and acquisitions, M&A) and Greenfield investment (GF). Since the dilemma of a firm between GF and M&A is similar to the one between cooperation and defection in Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), we used PD for modeling FDI. We discuss the conditions for the firms to take GF (cooperation) option by equilibrium analysis
Description: VNU Journal of Science, Natural Sciences and Technology. Vol. 25 (2009), No. 2, P. 123-131
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/342
Date: 2009

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